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[Crim. No. 6690.

In Bank.

Mar. 16,1961.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THEODORE GULLICK
et at, Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law - Instructions -

Testimony of Accomplice.Where a former porter of a market admitted that he instigated
a conspiracy to burglarize the market and aided and abetted
the burglary by disclosing his knowledge of the market and
its security system, the jury was not required to believe his
further testimony that he withdrew from the conspiracy before the burglary and an assault with a deadly weapon were
committed, and the trial eourt erred in failing to instruct the
jury that, if it found the former porter to be an accomplice,
his testimony should be viewed with distrust (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2061, subd. 4) and would require corroboration to support
a conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1111.)
[2] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions-Testimony of
Accomplice.-In u prosecution for burglary of
market and
assault with a deadly weapon, failure to instruct on the law of
accomplice testimony was prejudicial where, though the assaulted porter identified both defendants at the trial, he
testified that he had not seen his assailants before the burglary,
a month later, when asked to look at "mug shots" of suspects,
he was unable to identify his assailants,and six months after
the burglary he was taken to police headquarters for a lineup
and identified defendants as his assailants, after an officer
told him they had the men who committed the crime and
wanted him to identify them, his testimony was confused and

a

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 498: Am.Jur., 'Trial, § 739.
McK:. Dig. References: [1] Crilllinal Law, § 826; [2] Criminal
Law, § 1437(9).
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('ontradictory, and he tl.'stificu that he was ::;c"n'd to dl'ath nt
the time of the burglary and had blneked out ami ('oulc1 not
remember what his Msailants wore or whether he hnd gin'!l
their description to police oflicers; the ,jury mig-ht have disrE'gardeu this tcstimony for lack of independent recollection
and eOllvictptl 011 the te~ti\llony of an accomplice who had been
olTered imlllunity undcr Pen. Code, § 1324.

APPEALS from jUdgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from orders denying new trial. Martin
Katz, Judge. Heyersed.
Prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to commit lIlUrdCl' and for LUI'glary. Judgments of convictioll
of assault with a deadly weapOll and first degrce burglary,
reversed.
Joseph M. Rosen, undl.'r appointment by the Supreme Court, .
'
for Appellants.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent,
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants Theodore Gullick and James·
Robert Crumbey appeal from judgment... of conviction entered
on a jury verdict finding them guilty of burglary and assault .
with a deadly weapon and from orders denying their motions
for new trial.
Boy's Market in Los Angeles was burglarized and James
,V. Robinson, a porter in the market, was assaulted on the
evening of February 15, 1959. There were two principal witnesses for the prosecution, Robinson, the port('r, and William
Grant, Jr., a confessed conspirator, who implicated defendants
after a promise of immunity from the district attorney. Defendants contend that they had no connection with the crimes.
R<>binson testified that he was alone in the market cleaning
up after closing hours when he was surpri!';('d by two men
who stahbed and beat him and then tied him up. He managed
to shuffle into the elevator, where he was found three hOlll'S
later by poliee offieers and the viee-president of the market.
An offieer t!'stifi('d that Robinson describ('d his as!';ailants as
"Two male Nf'grol>s, olle five foot !':ix and one five foot SCyell,
one wei~h('(llfiO I1IHl the other lfi2; thcy both lilul hlack hair;
eyes, color 1111\01('\\'11 : Olle weal'illg browlI coat. and the other
dark shirt."

I
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Grant had previously been a porter at the market. 'Vhen
he was called as a witness, the trial court advised him of his
right to refuse to answer questions teuding to incrilllinate him,
and the district attorney then offered him illlmunity. (Pen.
Code, § 1324.) Grant testified that it was his idea to hurglariz(·
the mal'ket and that he deeided to "l'lI1ploy ~Ir. Crumbey or
someone heeause I didn't know too mauy fellows around at
the time." lIe met Crumbey to disl'uss the details of the
burglary. Cl'Umbey said he knew another fellow by the name
of "Buzzy." Grant testified that ~he night before the burglary he and defendants drove out to "ease the store." He
explained the security system of the market and told defendants how to break in. On the afternoon of February 15, about
three hours before the bUl'glal'~', Grant told defendants to
"forget the whole deal." They sa id, "O.K." lIe testified
that his next conversation with dl'f('ndants was 011 February
18, when they told him t1lathe :-ohouhl ha\'e gone along with
tht'm.
Gullick testified that he did not know Crumbey until he
met him in jail after his arrest for the burglary and assault.
Gullick denied knowing Grant, other than haying shined his
shoes. He stated that his nickname was" Ted," not" Buzzy."
It was stipulated that if called, Officer Jobe would testify
that he arrested Gulli('k, who first denied that bis name was
"Buzzy," but then stated, "Oh, yl~S, my friends call me Buzz~',
but you upset me. That is why I didn't tell you who I was."
It was also stipulated that on the day Graut testified that he
spoke to Gullick, Gullick was in jail on an unrelated charge.
Crumbey admitted knowing Grant, who "had ideas I was
fooling' around with his wife."
Defendants contend that the trial comt erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the law of accomplices and the necessity
of corroboration of acromplice trstimony. All their instructions relating to the definition of an accomplice, accomplice
testimony, and the necessity of corroboration of surh testimony
were refused.
[1] There is evidence that Grant was an ae(!omplice. He
admitted that he instigated thc (·onspirac·y anrl aided and
abetted the burglary by disclosing his lmowJeclgc of lhe market
and its security system. The jmy was not ref(nired to beli('ve
his fnrthel' tp.stimony that hI' withclrew from thc conspirary
IIl'for(' the crimes were ('OJIIlllitte,l.(See Cocle Civ. Proe.,
§ 1847; P('ople v. Cowall. :18 Cal.App.2cl 2:11, 242 [101 P.2c\
125].) The trial court ther('forc erred in failing to instruct

)
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the jury that if it found Grant to be all accomplice, his testimony should be viewed with distrust (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061,
subd. 4) and would require corroboration to support a conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1111.)
[2] The attorney general contends, however, that Robinson's identification of defendants fully supports their conviction and that therefore the failure to instruct on the law
of accomplice testimony was not prejudicial. It is true that
Robinson identified both defendants at the trial. His testimony, however, casts considerable doubt on the probative
value of his identifications. He testified that he had not seen
his assailants before the night of the burglary. A month later,
when asked to look at "mug shots" of suspects, he was unable
to identify his assailants. He testified, "Several pictures
looked like them, you know, you can't .... " Six months after
the burglary he was taken to police headquarters for a lineup
and identified defendants as his assailants. He testified, however, that at that time an officer told him that they had the
men who committed the crime and wanted him to identify
them. Hiil testimony was confused and contradictory. He
testified that there were two lineups about four minutes apart
and that there were only three colored men in the lineup,
defendants and Grant. He knew Grant, having worked with
him at the market. He later testified that there was a fourth
Negro in the lineup, but that he was a "young kid," much
YOWlger than the others in the lineup. On redirect examination he testified that he only looked at two men at the police
station. He also testified that he was scared to death at the
time of the burglary and had blacked out and could not remember what his assailants wore or whether he had given their
description to the police officers. He had deilcribcd them at
the time, however, as being "five foot six and five foot seven."
Crumbey is 6 feet tall, and Gullick's height doeil not appear.
From a review of the entire record we have concluded that
it is reasonably probable that the jury concludfd that Robinson
had no independent recollection of the identity of his assailants and identified defendants at the trial solely because the
officers had told him that they had the men who committed
the crime and then prl'sented defendants to him. If so, Grant's
testimony was crucial, and instructions on accomplice testimony essential. Under these circumstances it is "reasonably
probable that a result more favorable" to defendants" would
have been reached in the absence of the error," and accord-

)
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ingly the error is prejudical. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d
818,836 [299 P.2d 243].)
The judgments and the orders denying the motions for
new trial are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In reversing the judgments
of conviction entered on the jury's v.llrdicts of guilty, the
majority hold that the evidence would"support a finding that
William Grant was an accompli('e of defendants, and hence
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on the law
of accomplices and on the necessity that accomplice testimony
be viewed with distrust and be corroborated. The majority
refer only to portions of the evidence;1 but, according to their
opinion, "~'rom a review of the entire record," they determine "that it is reasonably probable that the jury concluded
that [James W. Robinson, the principal prosecution witness,
eyewitness and victim of the assault] had no independent
recollection of the identity of his assailants and identified
defendants at the trial solely because the officers had told
him that they had the men who committed the crime and then
presented defendants to him. If so, Grant's testimony was
crucial, and instructions on accomplice testimony essentiaL"
I agree that the failure to give the subject instructions was
error; I cannot agree, however, that there is any substantial
basis for concluding that such error was prejudicial. The
majority give only lip service to the standard for reversal
(under Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2) articulated in People v.
Watslm (1956), 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [12] [299 P.2d 243]:
"That a 'miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when
the court, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence,' is of the' opinion' that it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would
have been reached in the absence of the error." It is my
opinion that if the majority would actually be guided by this
rule and apply it to a fair statement of the facts in this case
the jUdgments appealed from would be affirmed.
The history of this case in the trial court is brielly as follows: Defendants were tried before a jUry on charges of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder,
'Significant aspects of the record, not mentioned in the majority
opinion, are hereinafter related.
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burglary, and kidnaping for the purposc of robbery. Robinson, the above mentioned victim of the assault, testified to
defendants' appearance at night in the market where Robinson
was employed, to defcndant Gullick's attack with a knife, defendants' binding Robinson with rope, and moving him about
the store, and Robinson's concealing himself in the elevator.
William Grant, called as a corroborating witness, testified to
his asserted initiation of the criminal plan and his likewise
asserted withdrawal from it. The rear door of the market had
been forcibly broken open; papers and empty money bags
were strewn about the cashier's cage; and an audit disclosed
that $849 in rolled coins had been stolen from the market.
The jury discriminatingly found that each defendant was
not guilty of assault with intent to commit murder but was
guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, that each defendant
was guilty of burglary of the first degree, and that each
defendant was not guilty of the alleged kidnaping.
It has frequently been held that "there is no prejudicial
error [in failing to instruct on accomplice testimony] where
the record contains ample evidence to support the jUdgment
without consideration of the testimony of the· accomplice"
(People v. Dat'is (1954), 43 Ca1.2d 661, 674 [20] [276 P.2d
801], and Ca8es there cited; People v. Wade (1959), 169 Cal.
App.2d 554, 557 [2] [337 P.2d 502] ; and cf. People v. Oarswell (1959), 51 Ca1.2d 602, 606 [5] [335 P.2d 99]). The
record before us admits of no rational basis for doubting that
the crimes of which defendants stand convicted (assault with
a deadly weapon upon the person of Robinson and burglary,
in the first degree, of the Boy's Market) were committed.
Neither is there any reasonable basis, as I read the record, for
an appellate court to conclnde that Robinson, although he
told the truth when he testified that he had been assaulted
and the market burglarized, probably perjured himself or
was mistaken when he testified positively not only that he
recognized the defendants as the perpetrators of the crimes
but related in detail the acts of each. Direct identification
by one eyewitness is, of course, ample evidence to connect a
defendant with the crimes with which he is charged. (People
v. Whitson (1944),25 Ca1.2d 593, 600-602 [I, 2], 604 [5, 7]
[154 P.2d 867].)
The record shows that at the trial Mr. Robinson directly
and positively identified defendants as his assailants. After
stating that he observed two men in the market shortly after
9 p. m. on the night in question, Robinson testified as follows:
$5 C.2d-l'
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"Q. Did they say anything to you T A. Yes, they say, 'We
came in here to rob the store and we got orders to kill you.'
"Q. Are ~they' the two defendants here' A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who spoke to you first T A. The first fellow there.
"Q. This fellow with the light shirt! A. Yes.
"MR. MADDEN [deputy district attorney]: May we have
his nameT
"MR. PrSER [defendants' counsel] : Gullick. . . •
"Q. The other defendant you say was by the place where
the empty bottles were kept; that ,is, the defendant Crumbey
here with the red shirt on T A. Yes . ...
"Q. After they spoke to you, then what happened' A. He
went at me with a knife and I grabbed him.
"Q. Who did thatT A. The fellow with the light shirt.
"Q. Mr. Gullick did that Y A. Yes ....
"Q. Did Mr. Crulllbey have a knife also or notT A. The
one in red; no, I didn't see one on him. . . .
"Q. When you got back to the point marked B [i.e., the
back of the store], what happened there, if anything? A. They
tied me up and I had my keys to the front door, and so they
asked me what those keys were for, and I said, 'Those keys
are for the front door.'
"Q. Where did you have those keys' A. I had those keys
in my pocket.
"Q. Did one of these two defendants reach in your pocket
and get the keys' A. No, they heard me and said, 'Give
them to us.'
"Q. Who did you hand the keys to T A. The dark fellow.
"MR. MADDEN: Indicating Mr. Gullick. THE WITNESS:
Yes ....
, 'Q. By MR. MADDEN': The two men you saw in the store,
are you certain they are the two defendants hereT A. Yes,
they are the two defendants there."
The majority acknowledge (ante, p. 543) that "Robinson
identified both defendants at the trial," but dismiss this fact
with the statement that "His testimony, however, casts considerable doubt on the probative value of his identifications."
In my opinion, none of the asserted weaknesses or contradictions which the majority then set forth justifies their conclusion (ante, p. 543) that "it is reasonably probable that
the jury concluded that Robinson had no independent recollection of the identity of his assailants.... "
The majority first assert that when Robinson was asked to
look at "mug shots" of suspects, "he was unable to identify
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his assailants." But the majority fail to melltion that when
subsequently asked, "Did you see any of the defenuants'
[photographs] in there 1" R{)billson answered, "No' '-allu i
that there is no testimony 01' other evidence whatsoever that
any photographs of defendants were in fact among those
shown t~ the witness. It is therefore improper to imply, as do
the majority, that photographs of defendants were shown to
Robinson and that he failed to recognize them.
The majority next emphasizc testimony that prior to letting
Robinson view a lineup of suspects a police officer told him
that they "had the men who committed the crime," and
testimony that only three or four Negroes (including defendants and Grant) were then shown to the witness. 'While an
identification made under such circumstances may perhaps
be less reliable than one might prefer, it does not necessarily
follow that Robinson failed to recognize defendants as his
assailants when they were brought before him or that he had
"no independent recollection" of the identity of his assailants.
The majority make much of their conclusion (ante, p. 543)
that R{)binson's testimony concerning the lineups "was confused and contradictory." It should be pointed out, however, i
that the questions asked of him by defendant's counsel were
themselves confused and contradictory, and could scarcely
have been answered in a coherent manner even by a witness
with a far better educational background than Robinson's.2
His failure to remember, a month after the lineup, the exact
number of colored persons other than defendants among
those shown to him is, in any event, irrelevant to the question
of whether at the time of the lineup he had an "independent
recollection" of the identity of his assailants. The statement
of the majority that" On redirect examination he testified that
he only looked at two men at the police station" is not a fair
summary of the effect which the trier of fact could have given
•A sample of such questioning follows:
"Q. They actually had the showup or lineup twice-didn't these two
gentlemen walk through two times' A. I think so .•..
"Q. When you went down there, how mllny men were in the lineup
the first time' A. I can't recall. I didn't count them. I just recall
those two.
"Q. There were three colored gentlemen, weren't there, the fourth
time' A. Three or four, I don't know, Mexican, Caucasian-I don't
know how many there was in the lineup. . ..
"Q. The fact is, they hall two lineups and the first time in that lineup
there were just th rce men of the colored race, is that correct! A. No,
they had these two fellows nncl nnother fellow nnel Grant. I don't know
whether they had more colored or not." (Italics added.)
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that portion of Robinson's testimony. Particularly in view
of the witness's lack of facility in either comprehending th('
questions of others or articulating his replies, such testimony,
quoted in the margin,3 could be understood to mean that he
looked at 10 or 12 men but was only looking for his two assailants for the purpose of identifying them.
Testimony of Hobinson that during the period of the assault
he was "dumbfounded and scarell" and "I am telling you
the truth, I blacked out, I don't know what they had on,"
could well have impressed the triet:of fact as an indication
of the witness's utter sincerity rather than an indication of
his inability to identify his assailants.
The majority also 8tre;;s (mdf, p. 5-13) a discrepancy between the estimate of his assailants' height which Robinson
gave to the police and the aetual height of defendants.' The
point is of little importance. The estimate in question was
made by Robinson immedintdy afl,'r his release from the
elevator and while he was still in a weak and frightened
condition, in an honest attempt to re'produce descriptively
his assailants' features from his mental image of them. It
remains true, a,> this court has said, that "Ordinarily the
power to accurately describe human features is with most
persons a limited power" (People v. Connelly (1925),195 Cal.
584, 593 [1] [234 P. 374]). It is therefore not surprising,
in the circumstances in which Robinson made his estimate,
that there should have been some such discrepancy.
The remaining weaknesses found by the majority in Robinson's testimony are equally without significance. This is not
a case where the eyewitness caught only a fleeting glimpse of
the faces of his assailants. Here it is undisputed that the
witness "walked right [up] to their face" and was addressed
by them; they grappled with him and knocked him down,
then picked him up and took him to the back of the store
where they tied him up; they qUf'stioned him about his keys.
'" Q. How many mt>n altogether did they show you that eveningl
A. Well, on the other men who were there, I guess about 10 or 12.
"Q. Altogether you looked at 10 or 12 men 1 A. Not myself; that was
other people, you know, picking the people out.
"Q. How mnny people were shown to you that you were to look at!
A. Just these two that came in on me . . . .
"Q.•.. Perhaps from whnt you told us before and wl,at you teJl u~
now there scems to be some confusion. Altogether how many mt>n \lid
you look at for the purpose of hkntifi('ation on the night thnt you saw
tht>se two mell, the \lefen(1nnts, nt the stntion? A. Two."
'As the Illnjority recognize, Gullick'~ height (10cs not appenr in th"
record. Crumbey, who is snid to 1,e six feet tall, t('stifle'] that he w,,~
"taller than" the others in the lineup (including GUllick).
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thCH thrcatened to put hill! illto the rl'fl'igeratol' but were tIissuaded by him from'doing so; 111111 the.,' fillaliy Ilt'agog-cd him to
thf' bakery allllll,ft him there. This Sl'['[eS of eWllts ('onslllIll'd
at lea"t 10 to 1:i miuntes, dut"illg' whil'h time Robin,;oll hall
ample opportullit:, to sec the fact's of his assailants Hllli to
Hotiee their bodily 1II0n'mellts aud their \'oicf's. ~
'Vhen eOllfronted thereafter Ly dl'fclluallts, both at the
lineup alld at the trial, HohillSOIl reppatedly aud UlI('(luivocally
idf'lltifieli tltC-1Il as the men Il'ho had attacked him on the night
of the crime. His testimony to this efi'c-ct, quoted hereinabove,
is supported by the undisputed fact that he had ample opportunity to observe the features of his assailants. It is unshaken
hy defendants in any material respect, and in my view clearly
sustains the jury's verdids "without consideration of the
testimony of the al'l'OIuplil'e [Grantl" (People v. Davis
(1954), supra, 4:3 Ca1.2d 661, 67-1 [20]). The presence of
Robinson's testimony distinguishes the present case from
such decisions as People v. Warrell (1940). 16 Cal.2d 103,
115 [8]-116 [9] [104 P.2d 1024], ,,,h(,l'e it was conceded that
"the only evidence in the record which way be considered as
implicating [the defendant]" was the testimony of au accomplice (italics added; see also People v. Bevins (1960), 5-1
Ca1.2d 71, 78 [SJ f:361 P.2d 776]). It follo\\'s that the ('rror
here in failing to instruct on accomplice testimony cannot
fairly be deemed prejudicial.
The majority, in eOIll'luding that it is "reasonably probahle" that the jury regarded as "crucial" the testimony of
Grant (the witness who could have been found to be an accomplice), appear to attach more importance to that evidence
than the prosecuting attorney claimed for it in his argument
to the jury. Such argument correctly summarizes Grant's
testimony as follows:
"There was another witn('ss, Mr. Grant, who testified that
he was acquainted with Mr. Crumbey. Mr. Grant also testified
he worked at the Boy's Market and was acqnaint('d with tIle
security system they had where they tel<'pllOlle evel'~' hour,
and in the evellt. T take it, that the ring is not madf', thrl1
that is some iudic-ation that something is wrong' there ill the
store.
"He testified that he talkro with Mr. Crumlwy ahout bur"Robinson testified on cross-cxnminntioll that when defendants were
asked to speak during the Iinenp h(' recognized them hy their voices
(as well as by their appl'aran('c), Raying, "Well, nftpr I heard it, any,
body beating you like they did mel lIon 't know, I just knew the voke.' ,

)
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glarizing thc Boy's Mcu'ket, t !llkeu to him 011 sever-al ol'I'HsioIlS
about it . . . at Adams and Normalldie in )11'. G nUlt's I·ar.
[Defendant Crumbey was subsequently arrested at this eorner,
and defendant Gullick's place of business was a bloek hom
it.] ...
"Later on they discussed it again, and Mr. Grant testified
that Gullil'k [sic] told him that he would get another person to
help him. ..•
.
"[T]here was a discussion as to what the best time would
be to go to commit the burglary of the Boy's Market, and
Mr. Grant told him the best time was to go after the store
was closed. They finally decided that the burglary was to be
committed on Sunday, the following day [February 15, 1959,
the day on which the crimes were committed], and they were
to get someone else to help them with it.
"The following day,outside of the Normandie Club there
at a bar on the corner, Mr. Grant talked with Mr. Crumbey
about the burglary here again, .•. and the person known as
Buzzy was introduced to Mr. Grant by Crumbey.
"Now, Mr. Grant identifies Buzzy as being Mr. Gullick
here.
.
"Later on, several days after the burglary, Mr. Grant again
had a conversation with Crumbey where they told him, 'Well,
you sllOuld llave gone along with them-' and of course,
that means Mr. Gullick and Mr. Crumbey had already gone
ahead and committed the burglary, and apparently there wa.t;
some inference that they got some money; otherwise, why
make a statement, 'You should have gone along.'
"But befo1'l' that . . . Mr. Grant had told thl'se two dcfl'll<1ants : .. 'Let's forget the deal,' . . . and there is no
indh'ation that Mr. Grant himsl'lf was the person who partil'ipat.('!l in this hurglary."
The prosecuting attorney continued his argument as to the
",itlll'S!; Grant as follows: "Now ~rou might say, we11, this
person, Mr. Grant, he is 110t a particularly reliable sort of
})(>rson. So I think that perhaps we have to look to something
(>lse to Iwrhaps give some credence to what he might testify
to. So, if you are somewhat suspicious, you have a certain
amount of corroboration or suhstantiation of what he testified
to here by what the victim, Mr. Rohinson, stated that these
defendants stated to him - - 'Did you make your rin~T
'When are you going to make your ring T' And he said, '10 :00
o'clock.' . . . The two def<>lluants told ~r. Rohinson, 'You
are not going to make that ring.'

")
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"'Vhoever it was who committed th<'sc burglarics had some
lmowledge of that particular securit~.. system, this phone eall
arrangement.
"Now, we have positive identification of these two men by
the vietim, plus the faet that whoever did commit this burglary knew about the phone system; and that substantiates
to some extent what :Mr. Grant told these men as to how they
could burglarize the store."
Finally, I would point out that one other circumstance in
the record of this case may tend to explain its unusual treatment by the majority. The subject circumstance is not one
which was before the trial eourt and is not one whieh, in my
view, shou1<1 afi('ct the disposition of a cause before us. Wittingly or ullwittingly, however, perhaps it does. Such circumstance developed as follows:
Defendants were jointly represented by an attorney throughout the proceedings in the trial court, but both served notiees
of appeal in propria persona. Gullick requested that the District Court of Appeal (Second District, Division Two) appoint counsel to represent him on appeal. The request was
denied. He then petitioned the District Court of Appeal for
an order augmenting the record on appeal by including therein the opening statement and opening and closing arguments
of the prosecuting attorney and the instructions given and
refused. These matters are not part of the" normal" reeord
on appeal. (Rules on Appeal, rule 33(a).) "If the appellant
desires sH('h additional record he shall file with his notice of
app<'al an application describing the material whieh he d<'sir('s
to have included and the points on \vhich he intends to rely
which make it proper to include it." (Rules on Appeal,
rule 33(b).) Gullick had not done this in th(' trial conrt.
But since his failure to obtain the initial inclusion of the
material in the record might be excused by his lack of ('onnsel,
he was cntitled to petition the revicwing ('ourt for augmcntation of the record. (Rules on Appeal, rule 12(a).)
Augmentation, however, is not a mattcr of right. It is
subject to the discretion of the appellatc court. (Kalm.1t.~ v.
Kalm1ls (1950), 97 Cal..App.2d 74, 76-77 [217 P.2d 64].)
The party seeking it should allege facts justifying aU:;!II1!'ntation, just as the original transcript of matters additional to
the "normal" record must be based, under rule 33, on a
showing of good causc. The moving party should show generally what he expects the omitted matter to contain and
how he expects to make use of such matter in the presentation
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of his appeal. (See People v. Parkinson (1956), 139 Cal.
App.2d 500 [293 P.2d 801].)
Gullick in moving the District Court of Appeal to augment
the record alleged only that the requested matter was neces·
sary "to properly prepare and present his . . . cause in and
before the Appellate Court." That court without written
opinion denied the motion. Gullick presented to this court a
document entitled "Petition for the Writ of Mandamus," by
which he asked that the District Court of Appeal, named as
respondent, be directed to order augmentation of the record.
This document was filed here as a petition for hearing.
In it Gullick asserted, again in general terms, that the additional record which he sought in the District Court of Appeal
contained "matter prejudicial to [his] substantial interest."
In fairness to Gullick, because he was then without counsel,
his petition might well have been denied without prejudice to
renewal of his motion in the District Court of Appeal and
this court might (in accord with its often followed practice)
have asked its clerk to direct Gullick's attention to the previously mentioned prerequisites to such a motion. This course
was not followed, however. Rather, this court, without even
the "normal" record on appeal before it and without any
suggestion from Gullick as to what, if any, arguments he might
advance on appeal, granted the "petition for hearing" and
transferred to itself the cause on appeal as to both Gullick
and Crumbey, as well as Gullick's motion, appointed counsel
for the defendants, and granted the motion for augmentation.
Gullick prepared a brief in propria persona, and presented
it to court-appointed counsel. As counsel well .says in his
supplemental brief, the brief prepared by Gullick "appears
to set forth the issues with reasonable clarity and is well documented." Counsel, although diligent, has been able to add
nothing to Gullick's own presentation of his case except a
few citations and a more professional manner. Even more
strikingly than in the situation to which I called attention
in People Y. Brown (1960), ante, pp. 64, 74 [9 Cal.Rptr.
836, 357 P.2d 1072], the actions of this court appear to have
hindered and delayed rather than furthered or expedited the
just disposition of this cause.
To reverse for a new trial in the circumstances here is, I
believe, to disregard the positive admonition of article VI,
section 4%, of the California Constitution and to work a miscarriage of justice directly upon the people of this state (as
well as a waste of money) and cventually upon the defendants
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who, on the same evidelll'e should almost certainly be again
convicted and, after the fruitless delay and expense caused by
the majority's action herein, finally have to expiate the judgments in any event.
I would affirm the judgments.
McComb, J" concurred.
Respondent's petition for a reheBlring was denied April 12,
1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J .• were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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